Today, prefix hijacking events are mainly considered from a technical point of view, rarely from a political perspective. However, especially in the context of cyberwarfare, the OSI layer 8 perspective becomes more and more important. Considering a prefix hijacking event from this perspective, an important issue is the "intention" behind the event: Did we have observe the impact of a simple configuration error or did we fall victim to an intended attack? Even if most hijacking events we have observed so far can be traced back to misconfiguration, some events were also already associated with a deliberate attack in the past.
Reasons and Implications
Most hijacking events comply with distinct patterns and indicators. However, even if these patterns, for example the number of MOAS conflicts an AS is involved with, make prefix hijacking usually easy to detect, researchers can only read little into the intention. It is not clear whether we observe a misconfiguration or an intended attack. The fact that the reasons for an event are usually hard to determine unambiguously gives opinion leaders space for interpretation or - being more critical - to substantiate their individual positions: Attackers may cloud their intention by referring to misconfiguration, media and politicians may inflate events to increase the circulation or fan fears to reinforce the own arguments.
How to Differ Between Misconfiguration and Intention?
In principle, the best solution for the problem I sketched above would be to make use of techniques like Secure BGP (S-BGP) throughout the Internet. This would allow us to protect BGP against all likely misconfiguration and attack scenarios. However, S-BGP and comparable concepts are still far from being used in production systems, most probably as a full validation of global routing information is complex, resource intensive, and difficult to deploy globally. But as cyberwarfare will become a more and more realistic scenario in the future, we should urgently become capable to differ between attacks against the routing and misconfiguration.
Focusing this subgoal, an interesting alternative to S-BGP seems to be BGP Prefix Origin Validation, a concept which is currently under discussion in the Secure Inter Domain Routing working group. The basic idea behind the draft is not to sign the whole AS-path, but only the origin. This allows ASs to validate whether an AS originating a prefix is authorized by the prefix holder to do so. Even if this limited authentication cannot prevent all possible threats to the IDR routing, it allows operators to detect the typical globally relevant configuration errors. In principle, only those wrong updates may remain undetected where the correct origin is specified. If this is the case, i.e. if a hijacker specifies an invalid next-hop or even an invalid path, prefix hijacking is most likely not a result of a simple misconfiguration. An intended attack or at least a very good explanation by the source of the hijacking event can be expected.
Benefits of Prefix Origin Validation
All in all, a simple solution allowing operators to validate whether the origin is authorized to announce a prefix has two important advantages: Firstly, those prefix hijacking events that dominate today can be effectively detected without inducing the problems comprehensive solutions come along with. Secondly, it avoids that AS operators are falsely blamed to steal Internet traffic with intent. Both aspects are highly relevant from a technical and political perspective, which argues for the solution - even if it cannot address all relevant threats.